TESTIMONY OF

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CHAIRMAN AND CEO, ROSENBLUTH INTERNATIONAL

BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, my name is Hal F. Rosenbluth, Chairman and CEO of Rosenbluth International. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today about the current state of the travel industry, one year after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I offer this testimony not only to provide statistics demonstrating the economic challenges faced by the industry during this last year, but also to leave you with my plan for industry recovery. Please note that the statistics and information provided in this testimony are not reflective of Rosenbluth International, but rather an overview of travel companies as a whole.

The past 12 months have been among the most dramatic in the history of the travel industry. In my testimony last year, I discussed the tremendous loss of travel agency revenue in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

One year later, travel agencies are still struggling to recuperate, which is demonstrated by the following statistics released on September 12, 2002 by the Airline Reporting Corporation (ARC):

- In the past year alone, 11.3% of all agency locations have closed. This translates to the closing of 3,274 travel offices.
- Also in the past year, 12.9% of all agency firms have closed. This percentage translates to the closing of 2,260 travel agency businesses.
- Total airline sales have decreased by 17% during the past year, a nearly $9 billion loss in sales.
- In August 2002, 104 agencies defaulted on their payments to airlines for tickets issued on their behalf, which is nearly twice that of last August.

A survey of 200 corporate Travel Managers, conducted from August 29 to September 5, 2002 by the National Business Travel Association (NBTA), determined that corporate travel is still below normal one year after September 11, 2001:

- 70% of Travel Managers responded that travel in their companies is down from this time last year by as much as 20%.

- 72% of Travel Managers said their travel was below 2000 levels, which is the last time travel was considered normal. In fact, 31% of respondents said their travel was down by 20% or more from 2000.

In addition, most Travel Managers see business travel recovery coming slower than previously expected:

- 62% of Travel Managers think that recovery will take more than 12 months.
- In addition, 45% of Travel Managers referred to the need for airline price reform in order for business travel to return to normal levels.

From these statistics, it is clear that something concrete and immediate needs to occur in order for the travel and tourism industries to recover. It is no secret that most major American airlines are in a state of financial crisis. In addition, the turbulent atmosphere of the U.S. economy and the prospect of war with Iraq can only hinder the improvement of our industry. Despite a slight increase in positive sentiment toward travel at the beginning of 2001, the Travel Industry Association of America's (TIA) latest Traveler Sentiment Index (TSI) shows a decline in the third quarter of 2002. The drop is mainly due to consumer concerns about not having enough money to travel due to the current state of the economy. The overall index fell 5.5% to 98.1 in third quarter 2002, which is within 1% of the index during third quarter 2001.

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

TIA also stated that with the economy recovering slower than expected, business travel is faring even worse than leisure travel, dropping nearly 9% for January through June 2002, as compared to the same timeframe last year.

It is imperative that we act quickly and effectively to enable the return to a prosperous travel industry. In conjunction with my testimony, I have submitted "A Fare Plan for Airline Recovery," which maps out both short and long-term plans for the rejuvenation of the airline industry, which is critical to both strong travel agency recovery and commerce, as a whole, in the United States.

We estimate that our Fare Plan will result in an additional five billion dollars of annual revenue for the airlines, more passengers flying at fairer prices, and companies better able to leverage their dollars while having a credible airline system necessary to conduct business. The second part of the plan for airline and travel industry recovery introduces a reconstructed and renewed distribution model.

It's a complex and rather arcane subject so I have submitted in writing this plan in its entirety. I will, however, be happy to answer questions you might have relative to the white paper later in the session.

A healthy airline industry, through the realignment of faring and distribution, in addition to cost cutting measures now taking place, should result in the return to a strong travel industry and the resultant effects on commerce.

About Hal F. Rosenbluth:
Harvard Business Review, inc. Magazine, CIO Magazine, The Financial Times and Fortune have recognized Hal F. Rosenbluth, chairman and CEO of Rosenbluth International, as an unconventional leader, a visionary and a trend-setter. Dozens of periodicals, including USA Today, The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Working Woman, have recognized Mr. Rosenbluth's business philosophies and practices. Hal Rosenbluth's dedication and vision have grown Rosenbluth International to a global company employing

5,200 associates worldwide.

The Business Enterprise Trust honored Mr. Rosenbluth for his company's courage, integrity and social vision in business with its Business Enterprise Trust Award. The National Conference of Christians and Jews bestowed him with its 60th Anniversary Humanitarian Award for outstanding contributions to the advancement of respect and understanding among all people.

In response to widespread requests for information on Rosenbluth International's growth, corporate culture, and human development programs, Mr. Rosenbluth co-authored a book titled, The Customer Comes Second and Other Secrets of Exceptional Service (William Morrow, Inc. 1992). The book was an immediate best seller, and has since been translated and distributed in the Asia Pacific region, Europe and the Americas. In June of 1998, Mr. Rosenbluth released another book titled Good Company (Caring as Fiercely as You Compete) published by Addison-Wesley. This book focuses on how companies are able to change dramatically while holding fast to core values.

Mr. Rosenbluth joined the travel management firm in 1974 and worked in all areas of the company before being named president in 1985, CEO in 1987 and, most recently, chairman. Rosenbluth International has grown steadily and rapidly under Mr. Rosenbluth's direction, with annual sales increasing from 20 million USD in 1974 to more than 6 billion USD today. Rosenbluth International now has the second largest presence in travel management in the world with corporate owned offices in 24 countries. Despite tremendous growth of the 108-year old organization, its commitment to providing the highest level of quality service has remained unchanged for more than a century. The company also has received numerous honors for its dedication to its associates including being named as one of the ten best companies to work for in America in the book titled The 100 Best Companies to Work for In America, by Milton Moskowitz and Robert Levering, and ranked 29th in FORTUNE magazine's inaugural listing of the 100 Best Companies to Work for in America, which debuted in January 1998. The company is also well known for its technological innovations, and was selected as part of CIO magazine's CIO-100 list of companies positioned for success in the 21st century.

As a public speaker, Mr. Rosenbluth is widely respected and in high demand. Highlights of his previous speaking engagements on management and technology include CIO Magazine, CFO Magazine and Business Week forums; conferences by Saturn and The American Bankers Association; and American Chambers of Commerce in Tokyo and Taipei functions.

Mr. Rosenbluth sits on the advisory boards of Snider Capital L.P., a private equity firm investing in the sports, recreation and leisure industries; and PlanetFeedback, an online company that helps consumers send their feedback to companies via the Internet.

Mr. Rosenbluth is an avid cattle rancher with a ranch located in Linton, North Dakota. He also is a member of the Beaver Valley Horse Club.

Exhibit A:

A FARE PLAN FOR AIRLINE RECOVERY

A great deal has been written about the very much maligned airline industry, most of it negative, and a good deal of it deserved. It is a fascinating subject in which most everyone has an opinion regarding it, but very few have offered up any ideas on how to better it. Although most love to hate them, to many Americans the US airlines represent a symbol of strength and a testament to commerce. While children gaze up into the skies and are fascinated by a plane's ability to stay in the air, many an adult wonders as to why so many are currently grounded in the desert.

Airplanes are an ingenious invention. As we peer through airport windows, we marvel at the strength a fuselage imparts on us. Yet when we think about the airline industry we ponder how the cumulative effect of so much strength has amounted to so much corporate weakness. As an intermediary, or for that matter, an infomediary, we have the advantage of a 360 degree perspective. We see far more than any particular stakeholder or constituency involved in the airline conundrum. We communicate at the highest of levels with airlines executives, service many of the world's most prestigious corporations, and communicate with customers over 100,000 times a day. It is from that position that we posit one company's formula for creating a vibrant, healthy airline industry that is good for the public, airlines, corporations and the country, alike.

Recently, many carriers have gone to great lengths to remove cost. Some are making headway, and some remain stuck in a quagmire. One way or another, the airlines must get their costs in line or they will simply perish. What is apparent, however, is that the airlines with great leadership also seem to those with the best labor relations and ultimately, the greatest opportunity for sustained success. The good news is that we finally have in place the best airline leadership seen in years. Virtually every CEO of an airline, whether major or low cost, recognizes the importance of its people and their collective customers. This is a great place to start.

Most of what is written these days deals with the cost side of the airline equation. I'm going to take a different track and focus on the OTHER two critical, yet misunderstood issues, REVENUE and DISTRIBUTION.

At first glance, what is outlined below may seem counterintuitive. However, corporations with sophisticated, realistic travel programs and legitimate airline discounts programs support the need for reform, and our approach to it. After all, where would corporations be without airlines and vice-a-versa? Companies and individuals want a fair price. They don't want to feel disenfranchised by the seemingly intractable or worse yet, illusionary pricing that exists today. Fare construction is esoteric and needs explanation in order for us to move to the airfare reform. It's too late to continue to work the fringes. There are too many livelihoods at stake and the public needs a profitable airline system.

The sad news is that nary a day goes by when tens of millions of dollars flow down the drain because the airline fare and distribution structure is broken. It used to be that what the airlines would admit to us privately, they now do so publicly. Recently there have been some pricing initiatives by airlines that address the so-called "edges." Fees for paper tickets, extra bags, and even non-refundable tickets are now becoming non-refundable.

When these recent fare announcements were made, we informed the 60 or so client corporations who subscribe to our DACODA Client Yield Management System that these new fees and restrictions will cost them $36M a year in the form of higher fares. If you play this out to the whole market, we calculate that the carriers plan to take back is approximately $800M worth of "edges" on an annual basis. While panned by most consumer advocates, this activity is necessary and will positively affect their combined revenue deficit, but like a long dry summer, one heavy storm does not a garden grow. Real structural fare reform is necessary, one that works for corporations, consumers, and the airlines alike. Reform that will increase ridership, improve average yields, reward corporations for loyalty and support, and close the gap between leisure and business fares.

I'd like to suggest that the airlines take a close look at the real cause of the slippage. Examine indiscriminate corporate discounting and the resultant effect of raising walk up fares to offset them, thus creating the disparity between high business fares (which less than 10 % of the public actually buy, a number far below what it was when this fare level was far lower and far more realistic) and leisure fares.

The issue at hand is significant but not complicated. To increase revenue, the airlines have been raising fares in an inelastic environment. To maintain market share, they have offered significant corporate discount programs. Sounds simple, right? In fact, the airlines have been raising published business fares in what had become the world's longest running game of Cat and Mouse. Just when a corporation thought that they had structured a deal to really lower their business travel expenses, the carriers would raise the BASE of those fares, effectively eliminating the discount. This practice gnaws at the very people these discounts are aimed to reward.

One unintended result of this ubiquitous discounting scheme has been that base fares have gotten so high that it has negatively impacted the travel spend (and corresponding revenue earned) from the small to mid size customers who don't get the large corporate discounts. The other resultant effect with this practice is that corporations with properly constructed programs, and who comply with the terms of the agreements, have been artificially subsidizing those who haven't. Companies not achieving the required market share and/or volume hurdles continue to receive front ended discounts as airlines feel pressured to look the other way, rather than enforce the penalties for non compliance. Where else can someone get the same volume discount whether they buy in bulk, or not? This has infuriated corporations that have lived up to their side of the bargain, and frankly, I don't blame them.

If we don't fix this now, a possible result of continuing to ignore this discontinuity is that during this era of financial pressure, the airlines might irrationally respond by eradicating corporate discounts all together, in an attempt to raise yields. This would not be good for corporate America, the airlines, or commerce as we know it today.

In a word, the corporate pricing structure of the airlines is broken. Airlines won't publicly state that they are in a mess they can't get out of, yet privately, they are quick to agree that lemming pricing has ruled the day for the past two years. Yet, in fear of losing market share, carriers have continued to match discount deals on some programs that are mathematically impossible for corporations to deliver—an irrational business behavior.

There is a better way, a way that works for everyone. For simplicity, let's call it **"<u>The Fair Fare Plan</u>"**. Here's how it works:

For the Carriers:

Step 1: Reduce walk-up fares from which all corporate discount programs are benchmarked by 30%

This will bring back the small business travelers that are price sensitive and cannot afford the current walk-up fares and are not privy to corporate discount programs reserved for larger corporations. If carriers believe in fare elasticity, this should increase demand.

Step 2: Reduce all corporate discount programs by 30%

This step will cancel out the impact of the walk-up fare reduction for airlines, while keeping corporations whole.

Step 3: Evaluate every corporate incentive program

If the deal cannot be justified in reasonable ROI terms, send a notice of cancellation. Rationalize the deals, but do not penalize those who earn and perform. In fact, since corporations that are currently performing are artificially subsidizing those that do not, they should be rewarded for doing so by receiving deeper discounts for enhanced performance. Those corporations should not have to shoulder the load for those that don't perform. After all, that is one of the major reasons that airlines constantly find themselves having to raise walk-up fares in order to try and recoup lost revenue.

Step 4: Be forthcoming with corporations
If upcoming schedule changes will make it mathematically impossible for them to perform on negotiated performance hurdles, deal with it upfront.

Step 5: Re-evaluate Web Airfares
Web fares drive corporate travel buyers, travel agents and travelers crazy. Is it better to save $30 in distribution costs and lose $300 in revenue? Take a hard look at the web-only discounts and ask the following question: Are business travelers able to buy airfares for less than they would via the company-preferred program? If the answer is yes, then remove that inventory from the web because either by design, or default, this only de-leverages corporations' ability to perform on the discount programs that have been negotiated. In the end this is a lose-win situation. Airlines win when companies come close to hurdles but don't hit them. Companies lose since fifty dollars saved "here or there" over the web only serves to cannibalize their discount programs and risk hundreds of thousands of dollars in discounted savings.

Don't get me wrong, web fares have their place, they are a good thing. The problem lies in the reality that many airlines maintain multiple pricing departments; one for published fares available through multiple channels, one for web fares on airline owned sites, one for web fares on non-owned sites, one for web fares on partially owned sites, one for corporate discount fares, and so on. The other problem is that in some airlines these departments don't roll up into a common organization, and thus making fare rationalization almost impossible.

For Corporations:

Step 1: Negotiate in good faith
Have responsible data, don't commit to what you can't deliver, and make certain you have the technological capabilities to move share and deliver volume.

Step 2: Monitor your performance.
Watch your deal so you can make periodic adjustments in order to guarantee achievements of commitments made. Ensure that you have the point of sale technology in place to quickly adjust share and deliver volume. Utilize a sophisticated travel management company that can apply the software necessary to communicate to you shifts in airline available seat miles, schedule changes, etc.— all that can affect your ability to perform.

Step 3: Don't accept short-term handouts
However great the temptation, never forget the tale of the goose that laid the golden egg.

For Travel Management Companies:

Step 1: Create value for your customers
Share your knowledge and expertise on negotiating fair and reasonable airline deals with or on behalf of your corporate clientele.

Step 2: Bury the hatchet between yourselves and airlines
Don't think that pushing carriers to raise their discounts out of revenge for lowering commission, or other perceived bad deeds of the past, will ultimately be of benefit.

Corporations and agencies need to work with airlines to help foster an environment that is win-win-win. Short term thinking equals short-term gain and in a short time there will be a shorter list of carriers available to fly. That is a long-term bad thing for buyers.

Our proposed solution promotes a greater degree of shared risk and is composed of variability in share and discount. Utilizing available technology, a discount rate would be agreed upon between an airline and a corporation in return for a projected share of a company's business for ninety days. At the end of that period, the deal would be measured to test assumptions and review ROI for both the buyer and supplier. The discount and share is then adjusted for the next ninety days and continues as long as both parties continue to see value. The days of evergreen discounting without sufficient post due diligence are coming to an end.

Technology exists today that is available to corporations, travel management companies and airlines that will pinpoint the exact discount level that will reward corporations for moving share and hitting volume hurdles, while creating incremental revenue for carriers, therefore making the discounts meaningful and long-lasting.

If we change course now, we can build a healthier industry with vibrant competition that will result in reasonable incentives offered to reasonable buyers in return for reasonable support. Or, we can stay the course and continue with Junk Bond Airline Valuations, a future of fewer carriers with less reason to discount and more reason to introduce oligopolistic pricing, unhappy buyers and unhappy travel agents.

Bottom line. We estimate that our Fare Fare Plan will result in an additional five billion dollars of annual revenue for the airlines, more passengers flying at fairer prices, and companies better able to get their monies worth while having a credible airline system necessary for them to conduct business.

Another problem in need of fixing is distribution. Whether a business' distribution is wholly owned, outsourced, or a combination of both, there exists a GOLDEN RULE: Don't under price your distribution network; you will obliterate its value. Every industry in the world understands the rationale of nurturing its channels of distribution except for one: the airline industry.

While rushing to reduce their distribution costs to win the approval of the financial community, airlines have let one pertinent detail slip through the cracks. By virtually eliminating compensation paid to travel agencies, their out-sourced distribution system for reservations and ticket distribution, they may have unintentionally created a situation requiring them to return to the 1950s and re-in-source their reservations and distribution of tickets. This would come at a cost far greater than they could have ever imagined.

For years now, airlines have been focusing their efforts around reducing their own expenses. The challenge is that instead of reducing the total cost of distribution, they focused on reducing expenses by the reduction of standard commissions to travel agencies. In essence, airline expenses would go down but the costs associated with distributing tickets would not.

By reducing commissions, and thus creating the need for agencies to charge fees directly to travelers, the airlines have created a predatory pricing environment. Airlines sell tickets directly to travelers with no incremental transaction fee. They absorb their cost of fulfillment by spreading their cost over their entire volume base. Concurrently, they pushed the travel agency community to charge fees for fulfillment, creating a significant price advantage for themselves.

If the primary driver for the airlines is to remove the agency distribution costs from their profit and loss statements, there is a very simple solution: institute a fulfillment fee for every ticket distributed directly by an airline. This would level the playing field by charging fulfillment costs within direct AND indirect channels of distribution and, as a result, equalize the cost of airline tickets across all channels. An airline would then be able to lower its direct distribution costs, increase its revenue stream, and equalize its channel pricing structure. After all, since the airlines pay no commissions to travel agencies and travel management companies, their most expensive form of distribution has become DIRECT. The expense of having call centers and the technology and communication expense attributed to it is far greater than the free and ubiquitous agency distribution system. In all candor, why would any airline want to field calls directly if it only adds cost to do so?

By charging a transaction fee, airlines would uncouple and create a transparency for their cost of distribution. They would create a revenue stream that would offset their internal cost of distribution, and at the same time further legitimize transaction fees for the agency community. The same rationale also holds true for hotels and car rental agencies. Travel providers need to reevaluate their distribution strategies and business models. Let common sense prevail.

Taking things a step further, and really pushing the edge of the envelope we offer the following scenario for consideration:

<u>1. You fly, we'll buy – A return to a classic distribution model</u>

Carriers should consider getting out of the pricing business altogether. The combined efforts have confused and frustrated everyone involved for years. Sell seats to brokers, businesses, distributors and market makers who make money on the resale margin. Carriers could create price floors and ceilings based upon relationships, the size and length of commitments and market preferences. Carriers should be content with selling at their cost plus a respectable margin. This basic commercial instinct has eluded the industry since deregulation. There can be no more making it up in volume.

The most efficient and productive carriers will win in the long run. Most industries have learned to prosper with this model. Just compare the market value of companies like Best Buy, Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Target, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, CVS, Rite-Aid, and Amazon.com to the <u>whole</u> commercial airline sector. These fine companies thrive on selling other's people's products. They often take inventory positions and resell goods and services to the public or to business. Not an alien concept.

Eliminate direct corporate discounts as carriers have proven their inability to price responsibly. Allow corporations to purchase seat blocks via brokers, distributors. A return to a classic distribution model will result in significant reduction in sales/marketing expense in lower or elimination of GDS and merchant fees, as the distributor/reseller will now take responsibility for these costs. Additional expenses could be removed as carrier direct sales and deal management resources could be eliminated.

<u>2. Allow Structured and Planned Consolidation</u>

Four strong carriers are more likely to compete against each other, as substitutability amongst networks will become more likely. The resulting competition will stimulate price and capacity controls. Non-stop origination and destination markets should see at least two network competitors. Other O&D markets should see more viable connection options.

By allowing 4 larger "network" carriers to emerge, economies of scale and superior purchasing leverage will be created. This should result in lower costs for aircraft acquisition, fuel purchasing, maintenance, training, and headquarters functions. Additional savings will be found in better utilization of airport gates and use of terminal facilities.

We foresee the following potential "marriages":

American Airlines – Having already gobbled up TWA to emerge as the largest carrier in the world should prosper in the future as one of four network carriers. With 20% overall market-share, a strong balanced network presence and excellent management, American is poised to not only survive, but to prosper. AA will focus on NYC, CHI, DFW, MIA, SJU, STL and SJC

United Airlines – After filing for bankruptcy protection, should be allowed to acquire the assets of US Airways and create a larger entity with approximately 23% market-share. We believe that the new, larger United Airlines can successfully compete as a network provider. UA would focus their activities in DEN, CHI, PHL, WAS, SFO, CLT and LAX.

Delta Air Lines – Should be allowed to acquire America West and combine to control a 19% share of the market. The new Delta Air Lines can fill out gaps in its Southwestern Region with a Phoenix Hub and truly claim a national presence. America West is simply too small and too fragile to offer any real competition in its current form. DL will consolidate its' assets in ATL, NYC, CVG, PHX, SLC and BOS. The only caveat here is that Texas Pacific's ownership in America West, plus their option for up to 38 percent of US Airways might place America West in the United, US Airways group.

Northwest Airlines – Formed from the joining of Continental Airlines and Alaska Airlines with Northwest will create a new entity claiming 21% market-share. The larger and more balanced Northwest Airlines will prosper from and enhance the many employee friendly policies of Continental and Alaska. This new powerful force will also count on a large international network to support its' success. NW will have a sizable presence in NYC, IAH, MSP, DTW, SEA and MEM

In order to address the inevitable doomsayers, the imposition of price ceilings on hub-to-hub monopoly services should be instituted to discourage price gouging in the following manner.

Example:	MSP to DTW - Nonstop
Now:	NW Monopoly
Future:	NW limited to charging average yield on Hub to Hub as for average of other similar stage length services. MSP to DTW average fares must not exceed average prices charged for routes with similar stage lengths.

I know this all sounds very controversial, but we have been conditioned by politicians and other so-called consumer advocates to resist the ideas of consolidation without allowing any serious debate on the potential merits. Carriers have themselves pointed weapons at their own feet and pulled the trigger when asked to comment on potential mergers between their competitors. Look how Continental fought to keep British Airways and American Airlines apart, but sees no reason why they should not be allowed to join forces with Delta and Northwest. What's good for the goose must be good for the gander. We currently have eight weak carriers, some in or headed to Chapter 11, asking for loan guarantees, all losing money and patiently waiting for the economy to brighten their collective horizons. Why not opt for four stronger providers, all with a chance to make a go of it? How many network carriers does the US need? Looking at similar sized markets may lead us to an answer. Japan has two, Europe has three, and China is moving to consolidate to four. Why does the US need more than four?

3. Foreign ownership/service rules should be lifted

Allow international carriers to invest in US carriers and/or allow foreign carriers to operate within the USA. There are some very profitable foreign carriers with money to invest. Qantas, Singapore, Lufthansa and Air France might all be enticed to make deals. Is it better to get hand outs from tax payers or investments from other carriers? We are all familiar with other foreign investments in US businesses. The global marketplace assumes these kinds of transactions. US companies own major stakes in of dozens of foreign corporations. Lest we forget that GM owns Aston-Martin, Opel and Saab, Ford owns Jaguar, Volvo and Land Rover amongst others and that DaimlerChrysler owns large stakes in both Mitsubishi and Maserati. We should no longer need or wish to sustain historical barriers that prevent these transactions from occurring. The airline industry is not sacred or immune from the global economy. In fact, the global economy relies on a vibrant airline industry.

4. Greater differentiation between Business/Leisure Products

Customer Service complaints from the profitable business segment have as much to do with low and common standard of service to all customers as it has to do with higher prices. In general, and regardless of the price paid, passengers enjoy the same seat size and pitch, meal and beverage service; check in experience, boarding experience, frequent flyer miles earned, gate waiting experience, and security lines. Unless you are an Elite, Preferred, and Stratosphere Warrior and even then that isn't always enough, you can count on the same customer experience as granny on her annual visit to the grandkids. You'll pay up to ten times what granny paid in the comfort that your extra contribution ensures that you can see you own kids on Friday night. Would this model be accepted in any other industry? Imagine paying $1000 more per night for an identical hotel room just because USA Today was left hanging on the door handle and you had access to email and a mini-bar. I would love to hear the conversation that suggested that in order to pay $100 a night you would have to stay until Sunday!!!!

It's true: the airline industry is broken, but it's not that hard to fix. Just as baseball was at the brink, so remains the plight of the airlines and the passengers that fly them. Many of the ideas we have tried to share will undoubtedly face enormous hurdles and obstacles, but as an industry participant, corporate advocate, supplier partner and traveler, we think they deserve their day in court. Who knows, maybe we have the formula to fix the industry….what we know for sure is that right now all we see is a recipe for disaster.